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GOING DARK: SCRATCHING THE SURFACE 
OF GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE 
 
Abdulmajeed Alhogbani* 
The Internet is akin to our oceans.1 While most Internet users are limited to 
what is on the surface or immediately beneath it,2 there is a vast wealth of in-
formation that can be found if one swims deep enough.3 
Whistleblowers, such as Edward Snowden and Julian Assange, changed the 
way people view Internet surveillance.4 U.S. citizens were forced to face the 
fact that the government has kept a close eye on its citizens through regulations 
like the USA PATRIOT Act.5 Most people believe the PATRIOT ACT only 
targets individuals suspected of terrorist activity, and do not consider that it 
could apply to them.6 A poll conducted in 2004 showed that only 29% of 
Americans believed that the government had overly restricted civil liberties, 
while 49% believed that the government had not gone far enough to protect the 
country.7 The opinion of the American people changed drastically when Snow-
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 1 Michael K. Bergman, White Paper: The Deep Web: Surfacing Hidden Value, J OF 
ELECTRONIC PUB., Aug. 2001, at 1, available at 
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/j/jep/3336451.0007.104/—white-paper-the-deep-web-surfacing-
hidden-value?rgn=main;view=fulltext. 
 2 Id. 
 3 See id. at 2. 
 4 Pierluigi Paganini, How Edward Snowden Protected Information and His Life, IN-
FOSEC INST. (July 25, 2013), http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/how-edward-snowden-
protected-information-and-his-life/. 
 5 Id.; see generally Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, 
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
 6 See Few See Adequate Limits on NSA Surveillance Program, PEW RES. CENTER (July 
26, 2013), http://www.people-press.org/2013/07/26/few-see-adequate-limits-on-nsa-
surveillance-program/press.org/2013/07/26/few-see-adequate-limits-on-nsa-surveillance-
program/ (“This is the first time a plurality has expressed greater concern about civil liber-
ties than security since the question was first asked in 2004.”). 
 7 See id. (providing a graphical representation of the 2004 poll). 
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den exposed the depth and gravity of the National Security Agency’s  (“NSA”) 
surveillance on U.S. citizens as well as foreigners.8 By 2013, 47% of Ameri-
cans believed the government had impinged upon citizens’ civil liberties; only 
35% thought the government has not gone far enough to protect the country.9 
As a result, Internet users began to realize the depth of the government’s sur-
veillance, and many of them started using proxy servers to protect their priva-
cy.10 Proxy servers disguise a users’ location and allows them to “go dark.”11 
Government spying is not a new phenomenon; it has been an ongoing cus-
tom since the earliest forms of government. 12 The NSA’s spying program con-
strains one of humanity’s most important inventions, the Internet.13 The United 
States government crossed a threshold that grants access to limitless amounts 
of information.14 They are overstepping constitutional boundaries,15 and raising 
the possibility of a police state.16 By advocating that surveillance is necessary 
for national security, the government provides an incentive for citizens to by-
pass the surveillance.17 Anonymity is an important virtue of the Internet, and 
destroying it causes more harm than good.18 Legislators must reexamine cur-
rent legislation, redefine what constitutes a reasonable search, and balance na-
tional security with an individual’s right to privacy. Courts must reconcile 
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modern technology with the U.S. Constitution. Moreover, the judiciary must 
fulfill their constitutional function by keeping the executive branch in check. 
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the historical devel-
opment of communication surveillance regulations and case law. Part II exam-
ines the infrastructure of the Internet, outlines the six layers that make it func-
tion, and discusses the methods that can be used to go dark and bypass the pub-
lic portion of the Internet. Part III highlights the right to privacy and argues for 
Internet anonymity by showing its benefits in real life situations. Part IV sug-
gests change to Internet surveillance legislation through a reexamination of the 
Fourth Amendment and urges the judicial branch to fulfill its governmental 
function. 
I. INTERNET REGULATION AND SURVEILLANCE 
A. Pre-9/11 
1. Early Forms of Communications Regulation 
Internet regulation and surveillance are not a new phenomena in the United 
States.19 In 1934, the U.S. government enacted the Communications Act of 
1934 (“The Act”),20 which served to 
[R]egulat[e] interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so 
as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States a rapid, 
efficient, nationwide, and worldwide wire and radio communication service with ade-
quate facilities at reasonable charges, for the purpose of the national defense, and for 
the purpose of securing a more effective execution of this policy by centralizing au-
thority theretofore granted by law to several agencies and by granting additional au-
thority with respect to interstate and foreign commerce in wire and radio communica-
tion.21 
The Communications Act was part of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
New Deal and attempted to centralize the regulatory process of telecommuni-
cations and provide affordable access to communication services.22 Additional-
                                                
 19 See generally Everett Ehrlich, A Brief History of Internet Regulation, PROGRESSIVE 
POL’Y INST. (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.progressivepolicy.org/issues/economy/a-brief-
history-of-internet-regulation-2/; see also Ray Downs, A Brief History of the US Govern-
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tions such as international telegraphs originating and/or being delivered to the United 
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 20 47 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 21 Id. § 151. 
 22 See id. § 390; What is the Communications Act of 1934?, ROOSEVELT INST., 
http://www.rooseveltinstitute.org/new-roosevelt/what-communications-act-1934 (last visited 
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ly, the Act created the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to oversee 
and regulate the communication industry.23 The Act prohibited the disclosure 
of personally identifiable information without the customer’s consent. Howev-
er, the Act did include some notable exceptions.24 For example, consent is not 
required if disclosure is made pursuant to a court order25 and the individual 
against whom disclosure is offered may argue against the order in court.26 
Moreover, the Act permits the President to override or amend regulations if 
there is a national emergency or threat of war .27 
In theory, the government’s ability to intercept information that threatens 
national security is important.28 However, this power has been abused.29 In the 
1960s, for example, the U.S. government conducted warrantless surveillance of 
civil rights activists and citizens who were critical of the Vietnam War.30 The 
U.S. government spied on Martin Luther King, Jr., Muhummad Ali, and U.S. 
Senators Frank Church and Howard Baker, among others.31 The government 
continued to abuse its surveillance power until the Supreme Court, in Katz v. 
United States, limited the government’s ability to conduct warrantless domes-
tic surveillance.32 The Court held that using an electronic listening device on a 
phone booth without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment and constituted 
an unreasonable search and seizure.33 The Court reasoned that “[t]he Fourth 
                                                                                                             
Jan. 24, 2015). 
 23 § 151. 
 24 Id. § 222(c)-(d). 
 25 Id. § 551(h). 
 26 Id. § 551(h)(2). 
 27 Id. § 606(c) 
Upon proclamation by the President that there exists war or a threat of war, or a state 
of public peril or disaster or other national emergency, or in order to preserve the 
neutrality of the United States, the President, if he deems it necessary in the interest 
of national security or defense, may suspend or amend, for such time as he may see 
fit, the rules and regulations applicable to any or all stations or devices capable of 
emitting electromagnetic radiations within the jurisdiction of the United States as 
prescribed by the Commission, and may cause the closing of any station for radio 
communication. 
Id. 
 28 In re Production of Tangible Things From [redacted], No. BR 08-13, 2009 WL 
9150913, at *1 (FISA Ct. 2009). 
 29 See id. at *6 (finding that the NSA conducted an unauthorized use of the alert list and 
made misrepresentations to the court). 
 30 Matthew M. Aid & William Burr, Secret Cold War Documents Reveal NSA Spied on 
Senators, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 25, 2013), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/25/it_happened_here_NSA_spied_on_senat
ors_19 70s. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967). In Katz, the government conducted a 
warrantless wiretap and listened to a telephone that the defendant, Charles Katz, was using 
to conduct gambling activities, and used it as evidence against him. Id. 
 33 Id. at 353. 
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Amendment protects people, not places” and therefore, that individuals must 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area being searched in order to 
claim constitutional protection.34 
The Court’s analysis of the Fourth Amendment is outdated in regards to new 
technologies.35 The Court has held that an individual has no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in what they disclose to third parties.36 In U.S. v. Jones, as 
Justice Alito opined, “[s]ome people may find the ‘tradeoff’ of privacy for 
convenience ‘worthwhile,’ or come to accept this ‘diminution of privacy’ as 
‘inevitable.’”37 Justice Scalia, on the other hand, noted that, “this approach is 
ill-suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information 
about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane 
tasks.”38 The two differing opinions exemplify the public’s standing on surveil-
lance in the 21st century. 
2. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) 
Shortly after the decision in Katz, courts continuously held that warrantless 
surveillance is constitutional as long as it was for foreign intelligence, while 
warrantless domestic surveillance is unconstitutional.39 The difficulty is deter-
mining what constitutes foreign surveillance versus domestic surveillance, as 
this distinction is often ambiguous.40 Intelligence surveillance also became a 
major area of concern, which led to the enactment of Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act (FISA) in 1978.41 FISA allows the U.S. government to conduct 
warrantless searches if the agency has reasonable grounds to believe the target-
ed individual is an agent of a foreign power.42 It defines foreign intelligence as: 
                                                
 34 Id. at 351. 
 35 See Timothy Casey, Electronic Surveillance and the Right To Be Secure, 41 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 977, 979 (2008) (“Recent controversies involving the government’s expand-
ed use of technological capabilities highlight the difficulties modern courts face when navi-
gating issues in the field of electronic surveillance.”). 
 36 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012). 
 37 Id. at 962. 
 38 Id. at 957. 
 39 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426-27 (1973) (ruling that the gov-
ernment did not violate the Telecommunications Act of 1934, when they wiretapped fire-
arms trafficker, Hubert Brown’s, communications without a warrant because it was a matter 
of national security). 
 40 See id. at 425-26. 
 41 See generally 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-85(c). 
 42 See id. § 1802; see also id. § 1802(b) 
(1) any person other than a United States person, who—(A) acts in the United States 
as an officer or employee of a foreign power, or as a member of a foreign power as 
defined in subsection (a)(4) of this section; (B) acts for or on behalf of a foreign 
power which engages in clandestine intelligence activities in the United States con-
trary to the interests of the United States, when the circumstances of such person’s 
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(1) information that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary 
to, the ability of the United States to protect against— 
(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent 
of a foreign power; 
(B) sabotage, international terrorism, or the international proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; or 
(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a for-
eign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or 
(2) information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to, and 
if concerning a United States person is necessary to— 
(A) the national defense or the security of the United States; or 
(B) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.43 
Along with the definition of a foreign power, FISA grants the government 
broad power to conduct surveillance on foreign agents.44 Moreover, FISA es-
tablishes a separate court, the FISA court, to process warrants for the surveil-
lance of foreign and domestic intelligence.45 The FISA court has been dubbed 
                                                                                                             
presence in the United States indicate that such person may engage in such activities 
in the United States, or when such person knowingly aids or abets any person in the 
conduct of such activities or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in such 
activities; (C) engages in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefore; 
(D) engages in the international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or ac-
tivities in preparation therefor; or (E) engages in the international proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, or activities in preparation therefor for or on behalf of 
a foreign power; or (2) any person who (A) knowingly engages in clandestine intel-
ligence gathering activities for or on behalf of a foreign power, which activities in-
volve or may involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States; 
(B) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a foreign pow-
er, knowingly engages in any other clandestine intelligence activities for or on behalf 
of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to involve a violation of 
the criminal statutes of the United States; (C) knowingly engages in sabotage or in-
ternational terrorism, or activities that are in preparation therefor, for or on behalf of 
a foreign power; (D) knowingly enters the United States under a false or fraudulent 
identity for or on behalf of a foreign power or, while in the United States, knowingly 
assumes a false or fraudulent identity for or on behalf of a foreign power. 
Id. 
 43 Id. § 1801(e). 
 44 See id. § 1801(a) 
(1) [A] foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized by 
the United States; (2) a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially com-
posed of United States persons; (3) an entity that is openly acknowledged by a for-
eign government or governments to be directed and controlled by such foreign gov-
ernment or governments; (4) a group engaged in international terrorism or activities 
in preparation therefor; (5) a foreign-based political organization, not substantially 
composed of United States persons; (6) an entity that is directed and controlled by a 
foreign government or governments; or (7) an entity not substantially composed of 
United States persons that is engaged in the international proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. 
Id. 
 45 See id. § 1803(a)(1). 
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“the most secret court in America.”46 This Comment will discuss the FISA 
court in a later section. 
3. The National Security Agency (NSA) 
The earliest form of the NSA was created during World War II with the aim 
of decoding enemy transmissions. President Harry Truman officially created 
the NSA in 1952 to continue code-breaking post-World War II.47 The agency 
evolved over time and the crux of their mission today is twofold: 1) infor-
mation assurance, which prevents foreign agents from obtaining classified in-
formation,48 and 2) signals intelligence, which collects and analyzes foreign 
intelligence.49 Because their mission, to safeguard national security, is extreme-
ly sensitive, the NSA’s operations and budget are classified information.50 
James Clapper, the director of the NSA, notes that the “budgets are classified 
as they could provide insight for foreign intelligence services to discern top 
national priorities, capabilities and sources and methods that allow us to obtain 
information to counter threats.”51 While the exact dollar amount of the NSA’s 
budget is classified, it is obvious that the NSA spends an enormous amount of 
money and manpower to achieve their goals.52 
                                                
 46 John Shiffman & Kristina Cooke, The judges who preside over America’s secret 
court, REUTERS, (June 21, 2013, 1:11 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/21/us-
usa-security-fisa-judges-idUSBRE95K06H20130621. 
 47 Tom Murse, What is the National Security Agency?, ABOUT NEWS, 
http://uspolitics.about.com/od/agencies/a/What-Is-The-National-Security-Agency.htm (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2015). 
 48 Mission, NSA/CSS, https://www.nsa.gov/about/mission/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 
31, 2015). 
 49 Id. 
 50 See Exec. Order No. 13,526, 3 C.F.R. 298, 300 (2010); see also Max Ehrenfreund, 
‘Black Budget’ leaked by Edward Snowden describes NSA team that hacks foreign targets, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/black-budget-leaked-by-edward-snowden-describes-nsa-team-that-hacks-foreign-
targets/2013/08/30/8b7e684c-119b-11e3-bdf6-e4fc677d94a1_story.html (identifying the 
budget as “Top Secret”). 
 51 Wash. Post Staff, DNI James Clapper’s statement to The Post, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/dni-james-clappers-
statement-to-the-post/2013/08/29/52d52090-10e1-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html. 
 52 See Wilson Andrews & Todd Lindeman, ‘THE BLACK BUDGET’: How Intelligence 
Agencies Spend $52 Billion, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/national/black-budget/project-files/black-
budget-doubletruck-web.pdf/ (noting the NSA’s $10.8 billion budget for 2013). 
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B. Post-9/11 
Following the attacks of 9/11, the United Nations Security Council unani-
mously adopted a broad, anti-terrorism resolution.53 One of the provisions calls 
upon all states to “[f]ind ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of 
operational information, especially regarding use of communications technolo-
gies by terrorist groups.”54 The United States took its own measures to counter-
act terrorism by enacting the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 
(“USA PATRIOT Act”).55 
1. USA PATRIOT Act 
Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act in October 2001 as a preemptive 
tool for preventing terrorist attacks.56 Title II of the Act relaxed the require-
ments for securing a court order to conduct surveillance and expanded the gov-
ernment’s authority to monitor nearly all areas of electronic communication.57 
In essence, the Act granted the authority to intercept all wire, oral, and elec-
tronic communications relating to terrorism or national security.58 Title VII 
called for enhanced cooperation and information sharing among federal, state, 
and local agencies.59 The PATRTIOT Act also redesigned the structure of 
FISA by superseding its authority and changing its purpose into a law en-
forcement body.60 Similar acts and amendments were passed post-9/11.61 
                                                
 53 S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); Security Counsel, Security 
Counsel Unanimously Adopts Wide Ranging Anti-Terrorism Resolution; Calls for Suppress-
ing Financing, Improving, International Cooperation, UNITED NATIONS (Sept. 28, 2001), 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2001/sc7158.doc.htm. 
 54 S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 3. 
 55 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 
115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 278, 283-96 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516(1), 2517 (2006)). 
 58 Id. at 278 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (2006)). 
 59 Id. at 374 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3796(h) (2006)). 
 60 Casey, supra note 35, at 1003, n. 147. 
 61 See, e.g., FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 
(2008); FISA Amendments Act Reauthorization Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-238, 126 Stat. 
1631 (2012). 
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2. The 2007 Protect America Act 
In 2007, President George W. Bush was granted considerable authority un-
der the Protect America Act,62 which was passed because the Bush Administra-
tion asserted that FISA was outdated and significantly burdened counter-
terrorism efforts.63 The Act amended FISA to allow the president to conduct 
warrantless surveillance on any communication that is made to an individual 
outside of the U.S., effectively removing the requirement of a “foreign agent” 
under the old FISA statute.64 More importantly, the amendment allowed the 
president to conduct surveillance with minimal oversight from the FISA 
court.65 
II. HOW THE INTERNET WORKS 
Section II examines the infrastructure of the Internet and the rules of tech-
nology that govern it. This analysis is twofold. The first part examines the lay-
ers of the Internet; the second part explains the immensity of the web and the 
trend to go dark in order to circumvent the reaches of Internet surveillance. 
One common misconception about the Internet is that it is something intangi-
ble and unidentifiable.66 Although that may be the case for certain information 
that travels through the Internet, the Internet itself is fixed and clearly identifi-
able.67 
A. The Layers of the Internet 
The modern Internet originated from the Advanced Research Projects Agen-
cy’s (ARPA) goal to create a network connecting four computers (ARPANET) 
using existing phone lines.68 The ARPANET was connected to the packet radio 
                                                
 62 Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552, 552-54 (codified at 
50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) et seq.). 
 63 George W. Bush, President’s Radio Address, WHITE HOUSE RADIO (July 28, 2007), 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/07/print/20070728.html. 
 64 ACLU Fact Sheet on the “Police America Act,” ACLU (Aug. 7, 2007), 
https://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-fact-sheet-%E2%80%9Cpolice-america-act. 
 65 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1) (2012). 
 66 See Internet of Things, TECH CRUNCH, http://techcrunch.com/topic/subject/internet-
of-things/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2015). 
 67 Forest Time, What is an Example of an Intangible Good?, CHRON, 
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/example-intangible-good-35031.html (last visited Jan. 16, 
2015). 
 68 See Robert Hobbes Zakon, Hobbes Internet Timeline 12, ZAKON.ORG, 
http://www.zakon.org/robert/internet/timeline/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2015); see also How Did 
the Internet Get Started, MUSEUM OF SCI. AND INDUSTRY, 
http://www.msichicago.org/scrapbook/scrapbook_exhibits/commex/history.html (last visit-
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network (PRNET) that links computers through radio waves.69 Subsequently, 
the two networks were connected to a third network, the satellite network 
(SATNET), and these three networks were later joined to other networks.70 
This concept of connecting networks together, inter-networking, became 
known as the Internet.71 
Information travels through the Internet by going through multiple layers.72 
The first layer is the content layer, which is comprised of the information being 
communicated.73 This may be a file, email, or picture.74 In the second layer, the 
content must pass through an application that uses the Internet, such as Firefox 
or Safari, which is referred to as the application layer.75 In the next layer, the 
content is broken into data packets and travels through the transport layer.76 In 
the fourth layer, data packets flow through the Internet protocol layer, which is 
a set of rules that determine how data flows through the network.77 In the fifth 
layer, the link layer connects the computer to the physical layer through an 
Internet Service Provider (ISP) or a server.78 In the last layer, the data packets 
flow through the physical layer, which consists of the hardware needed to send 
and receive information; this hardware may be an optical cable, satellite, or 
copper wire.79 At its core, the structure of the Internet is similar to the way our 
roads are organized. 
There are several rules, called protocols, which determine how information 
is passed through the Internet.80 The most common protocols are the Transmis-
sion Control Protocol (TCP) and the Internet Protocol (IP).81 TCP, which is 
vital to the transport layer, is responsible for taking information from a com-
                                                                                                             
ed Jan. 16, 2015) (“The grandfather of today’s Internet was called the “ARPANET,” named 
after the Department of Defense’s Advanced Research Projects Agency that developed it in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s.”). 
 69 Zakon, supra note 68. 
 70 Id. 
 71 See Mark Harrison, What is the Origin of the Word “Internet”?, QUORA (Sept. 2, 
2011), http://www.quora.com/What-is-the-origin-of-the-word-internet. 
 72 Lawrence B. Solum & Chung Minn, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and 
the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815, 816 (2004). 
 73 Id. 
 74 See id. at 816, 829-30. 
 75 Id. at 816, 841. 
 76 Id. at 816, 840 (stating that a “data packet” is a smaller portion of the original digital 
request from the application layer to be sent to the network layer). 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 816, 839-40. 
 79 Id. at 816, 839. 
 80 Id. at 838-39. 
 81 Lee Copeland, How-To: TCP/IP, COMPUTERWORLD (Jan. 17, 2000, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.computerworld.com/article/2593612/networking/tcp-ip.html. 
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puter and sending it as a complete packet.82 IP, which is vital to the Internet 
layer, is primarily responsible for addressing, fragmenting, and reassembling 
the complete packets to accommodate the network.83 These protocols require 
every network device to have a unique address, referred to as an IP address, to 
designate origin and destination.84 Without the equivalent of a device’s “elec-
tronic return address,” requested information will not arrive at the proper des-
tination.85 IP addresses ensure that the fragmented information is reconstructed 
by IP into a complete packet, which eventually produces a picture or file.86 The 
process of sending and receiving information through the Internet has a fixed 
starting and ending point;87 each point has an identifiable address that can be 
easily traced.88 
B. The World Wide Web 
The Internet, also known as “a global network of networks,”89 evolved into a 
behemoth that was difficult to navigate. The World Wide Web (Web) was cre-
ated to streamline navigation.90 All websites are connected through the Web,91 
and “if the Internet is the ocean, then the World Wide Web is a massive fleet of 
ships and submarines, taking people through that ocean.”92 The Web swiftly 
transformed the way people communicate and share information, and it hap-
pened on a global scale.93 It became flooded with information from an array of 
                                                
 82 See How TCP/IP Works, TECHNET, http://technet.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/cc786128(v=ws.10).aspx (last updated Mar. 28, 2003). 
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Internet users and it had to be organized in a manner that makes it easier to 
retrieve.94 Today, the Web is organized in two major components and a minor, 
hidden, subsection.95 The surface web is at the top, which brings up results of a 
standard search on any search engine,96 while the deep web contains search 
results on a library database.97 
1. Surface Web v. Deep Web 
Search engines such as Google, Bing, and Yahoo allow Internet users to ac-
cess information on the surface web.98 They are the vessels that take users to 
static and fixed documents or web pages on the Internet.99 These pages already 
exist as files on web servers and are readily accessible via a hyperlink.100 Most 
search engines work in a similar way.101 For example, when a user enters a 
search in Google for “flights,” Google sends “spiders” to index hyperlinks to 
static web pages that sell flight tickets.102 The result of that search takes the 
user into the surface web, however, “it is estimated that even the best search 
engines can access only 16 percent of information available on the Web.”103 In 
order to go deeper into the Web, the user must click one of the hyperlinks and 
use the website to create a dynamic search for a specific flight.104 
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Since most of the content on the Internet is located in the deep web and 
search engines cannot find it, this part of the Web is only accessible through a 
specific web server.105 The Deep Web includes websites with password protec-
tion; these databases cannot be indexed by search engines.106 The search en-
gine’s software cannot gain access because “when an indexing spider comes 
across a database, it’s as if it has run smack into the entrance of a massive li-
brary with securely bolted doors. Spiders can record the library’s address, but 
can tell you nothing about the books, magazines or other documents it con-
tains.”107 Books, magazines and other documents are a small portion of what 
makes up the deep web.108 
Understanding what the deep web is and how to navigate it is a critical part 
of the analysis. But one must also understand the vastness of the deep web. 
According to a study conducted in 2000, information on the deep web is ap-
proximately 400 to 550 times larger than the content on the World Wide 
Web.109 The study indicates that “[t]he deep web contains 7,500 terabytes of 
information compared to nineteen terabytes of information in the surface 
web.”110 When considering the number of documents available, the study pro-
vides that “[t]he deep web contains nearly 550 billion individual documents 
compared to the one billion of the surface web.”111 To put the enormity of the 
deep web into further perspective, “[m]ore than 200,000 deep web sites pres-
ently exist.”112 The study also shows that “[s]ixty of the largest deep web sites 
collectively contain about 750 terabytes of information — sufficient by them-
selves to exceed the size of the surface web forty times.”113 
Due to its size, “[t]he deep Web is the largest growing category of new in-
formation on the Internet.”114 Unlike websites on the surface web, “[d]eep web 
sites tend to be narrower, with deeper content, than conventional surface 
sites.”115 Furthermore, “[t]otal quality content of the deep web is 1,000 to 2,000 
times greater than that of the surface web.”116 When it comes to organization, 
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compared to the surface web “[m]ore than half of the deep web content resides 
in topic-specific databases.”117 When it comes to access “ [a] full ninety-five 
per cent of the deep web is publicly accessible information — not subject to 
fees or subscriptions.”118 Hidden underneath the deep web is a dark web, which 
is comprised of “websites that are outdated, broken, abandoned, or inaccessible 
using standard web browsing techniques.”119 
2. Dark Web, Darknets and Going Dark 
The dark web consists of underground websites and databases.120 This part 
of the web can be used for host malware, sale of illicit drugs, child pornogra-
phy, hit men, terrorists, and money laundering services.121 Websites like the 
“Silk Road,” “Pandora Market,” and “Hydra Marketplace” offer such ser-
vices.122 These underground websites use “bitcoins” as the main form of cur-
rency for the illicit transactions.123 “Bitcoins” are online currency with no cen-
tral authority or banks, which are exchanged online.124 Alternatively, political 
activists, the military, corporate whistleblowers, and victims of abuse use the 
dark web to maintain confidentiality while exercising their freedom of 
speech.125 The dark web is only accessible through special web browsers called 
darknets. A darknet is “any closed, private network that operates on top of the 
more conventional Internet Protocols.”126 Darknets bypass TCP/IP to ensure 
“anonymous, virtually untraceable global networks . . . .”127 Programs like The 
Onion Router, Freenet, and I2P allows users to join these darknets and “go 
dark.”128 
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3. The Onion Router 
The Onion Router (“Tor”) started as a project by the U.S. Navy for ensuring 
secure government communications,129 and then became a free program that 
helps Internet users defend against network surveillance.130 As indicated by the 
name, Tor’s software is an onion routing network, which consists of many lay-
ers of relay nodes.131 When data is sent and received through the Tor network, 
it is encrypted in multiple layers and passes to a random server on the network, 
called a node.132 The first node removes a layer of encryption, and then sends it 
to another random node, which repeats the same process and “each relay along 
the way knows only which relay gave it data and which relay it is giving data 
to…,” which adds to the secretive nature.133 Eventually, the data reaches an exit 
node that unencrypts the data and sends it to its destination.134  Once the data 
reaches its final destination, it is then sent back through another randomized 
path as encrypted data.135 There are over 5,000 nodes all over the world, mak-
ing it nearly impossible to trace the original destination.136 
4. Efforts to Thwart Tor 
Tor’s mission to allow its users to be anonymous on the Internet has been 
opposed by the NSA,137 while “other branches of the federal government are 
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helping fund [Tor’s] service.”138 The NSA “has been reportedly waging an ev-
er-evolving stealth campaign against the service for years.”139 James Clapper, 
director of the NSA, asserts that online anonymity should be eliminated “based 
on the undeniable fact that these are the tools our adversaries use to communi-
cate and coordinate attacks against the United States and our allies.”140 
The complexity and depth of Tor’s software has made it difficult for the 
NSA to find weaknesses or bugs.141 They began a program codenamed “Egotis-
ticalGiraffe” that attacks users downloading Tor on outdated browsers.142 Ego-
tisticalGiraffe recognizes the Tor download, infects the user’s computer or 
phone with malware, which allows the NSA to monitor the downloader’s ac-
tivity.143 According to Roger Dingledine, president of the Tor Project, this 
method does not allow them to do mass surveillance because “[t]here’s no in-
dication they can break the Tor protocol or do traffic analysis on the Tor net-
work.”144 It only allows them to identify specific users who downloaded Tor on 
an outdated browser. 145  
 
III. REMAINING ANONYMOUS AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
The Framers of the Constitution recognized that the right to privacy and pro-
tection from unreasonable searches and seizures are both fundamental liberty 
interests.146 These beliefs sparked the American Revolution against Great Brit-
ain after King George III repeatedly encroached upon these rights when he 
issued broad warrants that allowed agents to search any property.147 Benjamin 
Franklin famously said, “Those who would give up essential Liberty, to pur-
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chase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.”148 Frank-
lin’s quote became the rallying cry during the Revolution.149 The fear of giving 
a government an unchecked power over its citizens’ right to security and pri-
vacy underlies the Fourth Amendment.150 
A. Political Activists 
Freedom of speech is both a universal human right and a crucial element of 
a democratic society.151 This right, however, is not recognized in many parts of 
the world.152 North Korea, Iran, Cuba, and Saudi Arabia restrict speech and 
control the dissemination of domestic and international media.153 The Internet 
is a powerful method for communication, and offers a vital tool for people to 
communicate, cooperate, and collaborate.154 Revolutions that are spurred online 
capture the opinions, events, and experiences of a people over a period of 
time.155  For example, social media played a significant role in the “Arab 
Spring” revolutions that occurred throughout the Middle East in 2010.156 
A political activist’s ability to go dark and garner support against an oppres-
sive government may be risky.157 For example, Malala Yousafzai, a 14-year-old 
Pakistani girl, started a blog at the age of 11, documenting her terror of the 
Taliban and ambitions of becoming a doctor.158 Taliban members were angered 
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by Yousafzai’s values and her notoriety she attained through her online blog. 159 
The Taliban claimed she was becoming a symbol for the West and attempted 
to kill her.160 Similarly, other journalists and political dissidents need to remain 
anonymous if they wish to use the Internet to discredit repressive regimes.161 
B. The Internet’s role in Propaganda  
Propaganda is a powerful tool for uniting a group of people or nation behind 
a single goal.162 For example, Germany used propaganda in the 1930s to gain 
the public support needed to wage war and kill over six million Jews.163 The 
Nazis limited the information available to the German people and the interna-
tional community.164 As a result, the international community did not know the 
extent of the atrocities that occurred in concentration camps until the end of the 
War.165 The Nazis had intended to keep the extermination of Jews a secret.166 
More recently, civil unrest broke out following the shooting of Michael 
Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, and officials attempted to suppress the spread of 
information.167 Police fired rubber bullets and tear gas at journalists who were 
attempting to document the scene and arrested others.168 The police’s efforts 
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backfired as journalists uploaded the police’s actions to the Internet.169 Without 
the Internet, the rest of the country may have never known the seriousness of 
the events in Ferguson.170 By controlling access to news via the Internet, a gov-
ernment can portray itself in a more favorable light and greatly influence pub-
lic opinion.171 If journalists cannot go dark to bypass government censorship, 
corrupt regimes, such as that of Bashar Al-Assad in Syria, may continue indef-
initely.172   
IV. PROPOSITION 
A. Reapplying the Fourth Amendment 
The application of the Fourth Amendment to Internet surveillance has ex-
panded the government’s ability to conduct unreasonable searches. The gov-
ernment’s power is currently unchecked and must be recalibrated.173  The 
Court’s interpretation in Katz, that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not 
places, and that people have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” has become 
irrelevant due to the advances in technology.174 Understanding that the Internet 
is, in theory, a place where content flows, and renders nearly everything on the 
Internet incapable of protection under the Fourth Amendment.175 Instead of 
adopting a narrow interpretation, legislatures need to apply the broader ra-
tionale behind the Fourth Amendment, which reasons, “[w]hat a person know-
ingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of 
Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even 
in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”176 The 
Court must better protect what a person seeks to preserve as private.177 
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The reasonable expectation of privacy is a two-pronged test. First, the per-
son must have an actual subjective expectation of privacy.178 Second, society 
must recognize that that subjective expectation is “reasonable.”179 Following 
the Katz decision, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence held that there is no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy regarding information voluntarily given to a 
third party.180 Thus, the use of a pen register, a device that records phone num-
bers dialed from a phone, pursuant to a court order, does not constitute a search 
for Fourth Amendment purposes.181 There is no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy because the person dialing the phone number is sending this information 
to the telephone company, a third party, and requesting a connection through 
the company’s equipment.182 
The Snowden revelations show that an extremely broad legal certification 
permits the NSA to obtain this data.183 The NSA and FBI have acquired “tele-
phone metadata in bulk” pursuant to Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act.184 
A Section 215 order compels a company to produce any “tangible things” re-
quired “for an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information not con-
cerning a United States person or to protect against international terrorism or 
clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a United 
States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by 
the First Amendment to the Constitution.”185 The court order requires approval 
by the FISA court and must be supported by “a statement of facts showing that 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are rele-
vant to an authorized investigation.”186 The court orders were approved and 
used to compel Verizon to give daily records of all calls, “telephony metadata” 
between the United States and foreign nations, and local calls within the Unit-
ed States.187 The NSA has admitted to collecting records of millions of U.S. 
citizens indiscriminately, regardless of misconduct.188 This data collected is 
stored for at least five years on separate NSA servers.189 
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The NSA gains complete control over the data once it is placed on their 
servers, with statutory limitations.190 After which, NSA intelligence analysts 
have the discretion to access the information on the servers through “queries” 
that use “identifiers,” like phone numbers.191 However, one of twenty-two des-
ignated NSA officials must approve that the “identifiers” used to search the 
database gives rise to a “reasonable, articulable suspicion,” and the search term 
“is associated with one or more of the specified foreign terrorist organizations 
approved for targeting by the [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
(“FISC”)].”192 Requiring such approval is moot. Once the warrant is approved 
by the FISC, there is no legal authority to ensure the approving NSA official 
has a “reasonable, articulable suspicion.”193 Executive officers may have a rea-
sonable, articulable suspicion with respect to a small portion of the surveil-
lance they approve, but the vast majority of the surveillance approved is un-
likely to be reasonable and more likely to be intrusive.194 Regardless, the Su-
preme Court “has never sustained a search upon the sole ground that officers 
reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily con-
fined their activities to the least intrusive means consistent with that end.”195 
Traditional Fourth Amendment analysis requires a neutral and detached magis-
trate, “not the risk that executive discretion may be reasonably exercised.”196 
The NSA asserts that the identifiers are limited to identifying persons asso-
ciated with foreign terrorist organizations and should be allowed because it is 
vital to NSA’s counterterrorism mission.197 However, evidence has pointed to 
the contrary.198 A report to the government in 2009 showed that as of January 
15, 2009, a staggering 1,935 of the 17,835 identifiers approved by the desig-
nated NSA officers were based on a reasonable, articulable suspicion.199 Alt-
hough this appears to be a clear abuse of discretionary authority under § 1861, 
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the NSA argues that the bulk collection of Internet metadata is similar to a pen 
register and does not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.200 
The government relies on outdated court decisions to say that the nature of 
the data collected from providers (phone numbers, time of call, and date of 
call) under section 215 is similar to what pen registers permit.201 The current 
mantra is to treat NSA’s surveillance as it was treated in Smith v. Maryland.202 
There is a stark difference between how much data can be collected via a pen 
register in the 20th century and how much data the NSA is able to collect to-
day.203 A pen register in the 20th century allowed government officials to view 
a suspected individual’s incoming and outgoing calls for a specified length of 
time.204 The NSA equivalent of a “pen register” works in this fashion: 
[A] search starts with telephone number (123) 456–7890 as the “seed,” the first hop 
will include all the phone numbers that (123) 456–7890 has called or received calls 
from in the last five years (say, 100 numbers), the second hop will include all the 
phone numbers that each of those 100 numbers has called or received calls from in the 
last five years (say, 100 numbers for each one of the 100 “first hop” numbers, or 
10,000 total), and the third hop will include all the phone numbers that each 
of those 10,000 numbers has called or received calls from in the last five years (say, 
100 numbers for each one of the 10,000 “second hop” numbers, or 1,000,000 total).205 
This type of surveillance is grossly different from a simple pen register. 
Judge Richard Leon asserts, “I am convinced that the surveillance program 
now before me is different from a simple pen register and that Smith is of little 
value in assessing whether the Bulk Telephony Metadata Program constitutes a 
Fourth Amendment search.”206 The warrant is not limited to the collection of 
data on a single individual; it is mass surveillance that is capable of gathering 
data on every U.S. citizen.207 An individual certainly has a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy against this type of intrusion, because they would not have to 
dial the number of the target in question to be captured in NSA search re-
sults.208 If the U.S. population knew how detailed and intrusive the searches 
were, then societal norms would certainly recognize the collection and analysis 
of metadata as unreasonable.209 
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It should not be said that U.S. citizens assume the risk of government sur-
veillance through the use of third party channels.210 Yet, for citizens to assume 
the risk, there must be some notion of choice and unless citizens are willing to 
go back to outdated ways of communication, they have to accept the risk of 
surveillance.211 It is evident that most people in the 21st century rely heavily on 
cellphones and the Internet in their daily lives.212 Citizens should not have to 
give up their privacy when they have no other option. The Fourth Amendment 
should protect American citizens against NSA practices under section 215 be-
cause it violates the reasonable expectation of privacy, and “[i]t is idle to speak 
of ‘assuming’ risks in contexts where, as a practical matter, individuals have 
no realistic alternative.”213 
B. Fourth Amendment Protection for Darknets 
By nature, the Internet is a public network.214 Therefore, anytime someone 
uses it, they are knowingly exposing information to the public.215 Courts have 
consistently held that senders and recipients of standard mail have no reasona-
ble expectation of privacy with respect to information “put on the outside of 
mail, because that information is voluntarily transmitted to third parties.”216 
Similarly, “e-mail and Internet users have no expectation of privacy in the 
to/from addresses of their messages or the IP addresses of the websites they 
visit.”217 A Verizon customer has no reasonable expectation of privacy because 
they are giving their IP address voluntarily to Verizon.218 
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But what if someone is using a closed network, or a darknet such as Tor, to 
conceal his or her IP address? If a sender places an envelope within a box, then 
traditional analysis yields that content on the outside of the box is public in-
formation, while content on the outside of the envelope, which is inside the 
box, is not public information. Only the outside layer is voluntarily transmitted 
to third parties. Analogously, Tor users disguise their IP addresses using the 
same layering technique.219 A Verizon customer using Tor does not voluntarily 
give the company their IP address because Verizon cannot see it. Instead, Ver-
izon receives a multi-layered request.220 The customer’s actual IP address is not 
public information, because it is hidden beneath a layer that contains a differ-
ent IP address, which is what Verizon can see.221 
This analysis follows Katz, insofar as “what a person knowingly exposes to 
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amend-
ment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area ac-
cessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”222 Although the In-
ternet is a public network and requests sent to an ISP provider are public in-
formation,223 people use Tor’s software in order to preserve their privacy224 and 
they must be constitutionally protected. Accordingly, the NSA should be re-
quired to obtain a search warrant in order to unencrypt the onion routing sys-
tem and trace IP addresses.225 
C. National Security and Counter-terrorism 
The NSA asserts that the current government surveillance scheme is a spe-
cial case because national security is at stake and the program is part of a coun-
ter-terrorism effort.226 Therefore, the NSA must provide a compelling case and 
“[i]t is obvious and unarguable that no governmental interest is more compel-
ling than the security of the nation.”227 The government must balance individu-
al rights against the immediacy of the threat and the efficacy of the NSA’s sur-
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veillance program.228 The current level of surveillance constitutes a significant 
intrusion on privacy rights. 
The legislation in question was enacted in response to 9/11.229 Section 215 
“enables the Government to quickly analyze past connections and chains of 
communication, and increases the NSA’s ability to rapidly detect persons affil-
iated with the identified foreign terrorist organizations.”230 The government 
acknowledges that other methods are available, but claim that they are com-
plex and time-consuming, and might jeopardize the NSA’s counter-terrorism 
efforts.231 According to General Keith Alexander, the former NSA director, 
surveillance gathered pursuant to section 215 has thwarted fifty potential ter-
rorist attacks since September 11, 2001, including at least ten on American 
soil.232 Yet the government has not offered a single case “in which NSA’s bulk 
metadata collection actually stopped an imminent attack, or otherwise aided 
the Government in achieving any objective that was time-sensitive in na-
ture.”233 
It is difficult to accept the NSA’s assertion that the time-sensitive nature of 
the counterterrorism program is a compelling enough reason to intrude on the 
citizenry’s privacy rights. Less intrusive methods that require a heightened 
level of scrutiny, which may be slightly more time-consuming, must be set in 
place. The first step is transparency, so the American people and elected offi-
cials know the extent of the NSA’s surveillance practices. The second step is 
for legislators and courts to recognize that the NSA’s rationale is unreasonable. 
Finally, legislators need to amend the regulations governing NSA surveillance. 
B. Checks and Balances 
The efficiency of bulk data collection under section 215 and the immediacy 
of the threat to national security are insufficient to override the Fourth 
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Amendment.234 The judiciary’s role in government surveillance jurisprudence 
extends beyond a reapplication of the Fourth Amendment.235  The judicial 
branch must reclaim the power they transferred to FISC under FISA.236 
One of the core principles of the United States Constitution is the system of 
checks and balances.237 The judicial branch has been extremely hesitant to op-
pose the government with regard to intelligence surveillance.238 In In re Appli-
cation of F.B.I., the FISA Court approved the collection of telephony metadata 
on U.S. citizens and interpreted the NSA’s surveillance practices as indistin-
guishable from a pen register.239  In similar fashion, an Idaho court held, in 
Smith v. Obama, that a citizen seeking an injunction against NSA telephony 
metadata collection has no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to 
her cellphone data.240 Other courts dismissed similar actions on the basis that 
plaintiffs lack standing.241 For example, a District Court in Washington, D.C. 
held that the plaintiff lacked standing, because “[h]is generalized fear that his 
communications are being intercepted ‘is insufficient to create standing.’”242 
Opponents of current wiretapping and surveillance legislation have garnered 
little support from the courts because national security concerns have prevent-
ed revisions to surveillance regulations.243 At the same time, the executive 
branch’s authority in this area has been greatly expanded following 9/11.244 The 
9/11 attacks resulted in “the single largest loss of life from a foreign attack on 
American soil,” and left the nation in a state of terror.245 The government has 
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an obligation to protect citizens from another attack.246 Nonetheless, there must 
be a balance between the constitutional rights of the individual and the gov-
ernment’s surveillance practices.247 
The judicial branch must fulfill its constitutional function by serving as a 
check on the authority of the executive and legislative branches.248 The FISA 
court has failed to restrain the power of intelligence agencies over the past two 
decades. For example, the FISA court approved 20,909 warrants, approximate-
ly thirty-three surveillance warrants per week, from 2001 to 2012.249 During 
that span, FISA court judges denied only ten applications and approved over 
500 business record warrants, which also include bulk metadata from phone 
and Internet providers under section 215.250 Most notably, the FISA court “sub-
stantially modified” 376 of the 417 business record warrants for 2011 and 
2012.251 It can be reasonably inferred that the modifications by the court show 
that the FISA court is doing everything it can to approve warrants for the NSA, 
because the court does not reject them completely. 
The FISA court is classified and works in complete secrecy.252 The judges 
who preside over this court are appointed to a term of one to seven years by the 
Chief Justice of the United States.253 Judges meet with prosecutors and federal 
agents in a secure room to hear application requests for warrants.254 According 
to Reggie Walton, former senior judge at the FISA court, the meetings consist 
of 
a rigorous review process of applications submitted by the executive branch, spear-
headed initially by five judicial branch lawyers who are national security experts, and 
then by the judges, to ensure that the court’s authorizations comport with what the ap-
plicable statutes authorize.255 
Walton’s statements are difficult to believe given that FISA judges granted 
99.9% of warrant requests in the twelve years following 9/11.256 
The FISA court’s warrant approval rate has led many to believe they are a 
rubber stamp for the executive branch and are failing to perform their judicial 
duty.257 Furthermore, FISA court proceedings are ex parte, which means they 
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only hear from one party.258 The government justifies an ex parte proceeding 
because adversarial proceedings are time-consuming, costly, and can obstruct 
investigations.259 However, there is a reasonable concern that without someone 
to argue the other side, the FISA court is turning into “an administrative, rather 
than a judicial, body.”260 James Robertson, a former FISA judge, explains, a 
judge must hear both sides of a case to remain unbiased and impartial.261 
Provisions mandate that the denial of any application before the FISA court 
is reviewed by three judges from the U.S. District Courts.262 Additionally, if the 
application is denied a second time, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to re-
view the application and approve it.263 The current system allows the NSA 
three opportunities to petition the courts for approval of vague, broad, and con-
tinuing warrants, all of which are ex parte.264 Furthermore, § 1861 does not 
include an express right for third parties to challenge the legality of the NSA’s 
production orders approved under § 1803.265 The party that may challenge the 
NSA in court is the person or entity receiving a production order, which is lim-
ited by a one year statute of limitations.266 Litigation is further limited because 
§ 1861 requires: 
A judge considering a petition to modify or set aside a nondisclosure order may grant 
such petition only if the judge finds that there is no reason to believe that disclosure 
may endanger the national security of the United States, interfere with a criminal, 
counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, interfere with diplomatic rela-
tions, or endanger the life or physical safety of any person.267 
Moreover, if the judge’s discretion finds that disclosure will not endanger 
the national security of the United States, that decision may be overturned: 
If, upon filing of such a petition, the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, an 
Assistant Attorney General, or the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation cer-
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tifies that disclosure may endanger the national security of the United States or inter-
fere with diplomatic relations, such certification shall be treated as conclusive, unless 
the judge finds that the certification was made in bad faith.268 
As previously discussed, national security is the overarching goal of the 
NSA’s surveillance program.269 Due to that, no one has been afforded a viable 
opportunity to challenge the NSA’s actions in court, which is why a neutral 
party must be allowed to participate in the proceedings. 
Given that the NSA and the FISA court operate under a shroud of secrecy, it 
does not seem that Congress anticipated that ordinary citizens would know 
about the existence of these production orders.270 This conclusion is evident 
because the statutes governing such programs do not allow third party plain-
tiffs.271 A neutral lawyer must be granted in the statute to question the govern-
ment’s actions and argue for the rights of the people. Furthermore, a neutral 
lawyer will counteract the flaws inherent in the statutes. As stalwart as the 
NSA’s mission to protect national security may be, they have made misrepre-
sentations to the FISA court; a neutral lawyer will help keep the NSA in 
check.272 
C. Dissuading the Naysayers 
There are many who believe that the NSA’s surveillance program is benefi-
cial to the nation and who are not concerned about the agency’s practices.273 
Differing opinions are important to a healthy democracy.274 Supporters of the 
surveillance programs may be persuaded to change their opinion once they 
realize how the program has been abused.275 For example, the NSA has admit-
ted that at least a dozen of its employees have abused the surveillance program 
to spy on their significant others.276 The broad warrants issued by the FISA 
court for production of telephony metadata has given the NSA and its employ-
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ees access to information about virtually any person in the United States.277 
What should be more alarming is what NSA employees do behind closed 
doors.278 
Adrienne Kinne, a former analyst at the NSA, exposed the fact that she and 
her co-workers had been spying on U.S. soldiers’ phone calls.279 During her 
tenure at NSA, she was listening in on “everyday, average, ordinary Americans 
who happened to be in the Middle East, in our area of intercept and happened 
to be making these phone calls on satellite phones.”280 The phone calls were 
intimate and NSA employees “routinely shared salacious or tantalizing phone 
calls that had been intercepted, alerting office mates to certain time codes of 
‘cuts’ that were available on each operator’s computer.”281 These are but a few 
of the known abuses that have occurred and should serve as a warning to sup-
porters of the NSA’s surveillance practices. 
The bulk collection program is doing more harm than good, because “[b]y 
casting the net so wide and continuing to collect on Americans and aid organi-
zations, it’s almost like they’re making the haystack bigger and it’s harder to 
find that piece of information that might actually be useful to somebody.”282 
Kinne admits that she wasted a significant amount of time listening to innocent 
Americans, instead of looking for terrorists in the huge net cast by the NSA’s 
surveillance program.283 
Governments spy on other governments and on their own citizens.284 As a 
result, the market for surveillance software has greatly expanded, and the fear 
that ordinary citizens will have the ability to spy on each other has become a 
reality.285 For only ninety dollars, an individual can install software on any 
phone that is capable of giving them real time images of what the phone user is 
doing, as well as access to text messages, email, pictures, contacts, and virtual-
ly anything on the phone itself.286 The NSA plays a huge role in the market, 
because they give scholarships to computer science students that require a 
“four-year working stint with the NSA, and then [students] left to go out to 
                                                
 277 Id. 
 278 Id. 
 279 Brian Ross, Inside Account of U.S. Eavesdropping on Americans, ABC NEWS (Oct. 9, 
2008), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=5987804&page=1#.UbCL_vaDSlg. 
 280 Id. 
 281 Id. 
 282 Id. 
 283 Id. 
 284 Morton Halperin, I Spy, You Spy: Limiting Government Surveillance of Private Citi-
zens, THE HUFFINGTON POST (May 7, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/morton-h-
halperin/i-spy-you-spy-limiting-government-surveillance_b_5269132.html. 
 285 PhoneSheriff, TOP TEN REVIEWS, http://cell-phone-monitoring-software-
review.toptenreviews.com/phonesheriff-review.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2014). 
 286 Id. 
2015] Going Dark 499 
California and start private cybersecurity companies in Silicon Valley.”287 
Keith Alexander, former NSA director, owns and operates his own private cy-
bersecurity consulting firm, which advises private companies about network 
security.288 Although people may have nothing to hide with respect to their 
government, they should be weary of the NSA’s surveillance and the far-
reaching consequences of the legislation that supports the agency. 289  
 
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. government is not on a mission to abolish American’s privacy 
rights and turn into a repressive regime.290 Yet, the fear that they might should 
not be understated. The executive branch’s power has been expanded greatly 
and “all men having power ought to be distrusted to a certain degree.”291 As the 
legislative and judicial branches reconcile privacy expectations with modern 
technology, they should be wary of sacrificing liberty for the sake of a fleeting 
sense of security.292 Terrorists are already operating under the assumption that 
the NSA is doing everything in its power to thwart potential attacks, and they 
are responding by going dark.293 
Modern courts seek a proper application of the Fourth Amendment adapted 
to modern technology.294 The next step is for the courts to understand that tech-
nology is rapidly evolving, and that they must be flexible to find a proper solu-
tion. This is about accountability. The Constitution is something ‘we the peo-
ple’ placed on the government.295 On November 18, 2014, legislators had the 
ability to curtail the NSA’s surveillance program.296 Senator Patrick Leahy’s 
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bill to limit the NSA’s telephony metadata collection program was up for a 
vote, which needed sixty votes to pass.297 It was the hope of the American peo-
ple that our government will respond to the encroachment it has allowed thus 
far. Unfortunately, Leahy’s USA FREEDOM Act of 2014 fell short of the six-
ty votes needed to pass.298 The votes were divided among party lines, with the 
exception of a few votes on each side.299 Most view the outcome as a major 
loss for privacy advocates, because the Patriot Act has not been curtailed in 
any way.300 However, the rejection of the USA FREEDOM Act has the poten-
tial of being a major win for privacy advocates. 
Leahy’s proposed Act, among other things, would have limited the breadth 
of the Patriot Act by changing definitions, time limits, targets, and requiring an 
appointment of special advocates to question any certification or application 
for an order.301 For the proposal to gain support in the Senate from proponents 
of intelligence gathering, the proposed Act would have amended the Patriot 
Act’s sunset provisions for section 215, which are set to expire on June 1, 
2015, and extended that date to December 31, 2017.302 The good news for pri-
vacy advocates is that section 215 will, unless Congress votes otherwise, ex-
pire in the summer of 2015.303 Moreover, Leahy’s proposed Act would have 
been a patch on legislation that has tremendous amounts of faults, which can 
only be solved by tearing it apart and starting from scratch. The bad news for 
privacy advocates is that the majority of the newly elected Congress supports 
the Patriot Act and section 215.304 
The months leading up to the summer of 2015 will be a crucial time for pri-
vacy advocates and policy makers. Having the power and capability to inter-
cept mass amounts of data for intelligence gathering purposes, does not give 
our government the right to impinge on our civil liberties. That is not to say 
that intelligence gathering is unimportant. Simply that it should coincide with 
the fundamental rights we have as American citizens. If our government fails 
to do so, then more people will begin to operate in the dark and open the 
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floodgates to unforeseen and unprecedented problems.305 As was the case with 
Tor, this is not the first time that a government sponsored program backfires.306 
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